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SELF-DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF OTHERS,
AND THE STATE
DARRELL A. H. MILLER*
I
INTRODUCTION
Self-defense often is described as being innate, inalienable, and individual.
But the Supreme Court has never expressly held self-defense to be a
constitutional right.1 Instead, for most of American history, courts and
commentators pared self-defense from criminal sanctions, plucked it from the
common law, or sounded it from the penumbras of Due Process or the Ninth
Amendment.2
District of Columbia v. Heller3 is the closest the Court has come to stating that
self-defense is a constitutional right. Heller held that the Second Amendment
protects the right to keep and bear an arm in the home for self-protection.4 The
majority described individual self-defense as the “central component” of the
Second Amendment,5 a right that “pre-exist[s]” the written Constitution.6 In
Heller’s sequel, McDonald v. City of Chicago, the majority described the right to

Copyright © 2017 by Darrell A. H. Miller.
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor, Duke Law School. Thanks to my Duke faculty colleagues at the summer workshop for
their comments and especially to Susan Liebell, Maggie Lemos, and Alice Ristroph for their suggestions
and insight. Leah Colucci provided excellent research assistance.
1. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 GA.
L. REV. 107, 173 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never articulated self-defense as a constitutional
right . . . .”); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2007) (“Lethal self-defense is so broadly accepted that courts
have rarely encountered grave restrictions on it, and thus haven’t squarely decided whether the federal
Constitution protects it.”).
2. See United States v. Waldman, 835 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2016) (looking to “the common law
as a guide” where a federal statute is silent on a question of affirmative defenses); Taylor v. Withrow, 288
F.3d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[F]ailure to instruct a jury on self-defense when the instruction has been
requested and there is sufficient evidence to support such a charge violates a criminal defendant’s rights
under the due process clause.”); State v. Rader, 186 P. 79, 92 (Or. 1919) (Harris, J., concurring) (noting
the practice of equity as a source of self-defense); Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 187, 194–96 (2006) (identifying the Ninth Amendment as a source of self-defense in constitutional
law).
3. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4. Id. at 628–29.
5. Id. at 599.
6. Id. at 592. Heller actually focused on a “pre-existing” right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense, but this article will assume the “primary” right of self-defense predates the Constitution as much
as the “auxiliary” right to have arms for that purpose. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond,
The Second Amendment: Towards an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 322–23 & n.46
(1991) (discussing primary and auxiliary rights).
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self-defense as “basic” and “deeply rooted.”7 Though Heller and McDonald still
did not directly state that self-defense is constitutional law, these cases appear to
make self-defense more a matter of federal constitutional concern than ever
before.
Yet, these decisions—and the lower courts that have followed them—have
done little to define this “central” feature of the Amendment. Sometimes judges
or commentators suggest that the terms “preexisting,” “basic,” and “deeply
rooted” mean the Second Amendment is fixed in English common law tradition.8
Sometimes they use these terms to mean that the Second Amendment codifies
natural rights philosophy.9 Some decisions appear to expand these sources,
suggesting that Second Amendment self-defense is not tied to any one culture,
nation, or time, but is trans-cultural, trans-national, and trans-temporal.10 Some
reject any human agency for the right. For them, self-defense is not a creature of
constitutions, common law, history, or tradition, but is written into the soul of
man by God.11
This article investigates what it means to say the “central component” of the
Second Amendment is self-defense and explores how that “central component”
relates to firearm policy. It assumes that Heller understands Second Amendment
self-defense to be derived from a body of Anglo-American jurisprudence that
pre-exists the Founding. Given this assumption, self-defense, as well as its close
relative, defense of others, has been far from inalienable, individual, or innate.
Instead it has been heavily conditioned and constructed by the state.
Early self-defense law in the Anglo-American tradition presumed that
homicide—even in self-defense—required the pardon of the sovereign. Only
those slayers who killed as an actual or constructive agent of the state were
completely innocent. Especially when self-defense extended beyond the home to
the public, to the defense of others, and to the apprehension or prevention of a
felony, state construction and regulation of self-defense was the rule, not the
exception.
7. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
8. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593–95; see also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–37 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Heller); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (same); Jonathan Meltzer,
Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486,
1503−04 (2014).
9. See Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 15-2234, 2016 WL 2908407, at *6 (D.D.C. May 17, 2016)
(“[T]he first step in the historical inquiry [for the Second Amendment] is examining the right we inherited
from English and natural law.”); see also Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American
Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2011).
10. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (“Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems
from ancient times to the present day . . . .”).
11. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 15 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ky. 1929) (“The right of self-defense is not
derived from any statutory enactment, but is a God-given right which man had when he was yet a savage
and which he did not surrender when he came into civil society.”); see also REPUBLICAN PARTY, WE
BELIEVE IN AMERICA: REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 13 (2012), https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.
com/docs/2012GOPPlatform.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY4B-Y3RG] (“We acknowledge, support, and
defend the law-abiding citizen’s God-given right of self-defense.”).
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This article supports this historical investigation with new scholarship on
political philosophy and theories of justification. These scholars argue that selfdefense and defense of others depend on notions of public authority. As one
theorist states, private citizens have power to execute their judgment “only
insofar as they stand in the shoes of public officials to whom this authority
belongs.”12 These theories of justification arise from, and respond to, early
modern or Enlightenment philosophy, but are not bound by them. Although the
issue is contestable, this article assumes that the Constitution does not enact the
political philosophy of Thomas Paine or John Locke any more than it “enact[s]
Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”13 It assumes that an accurate legal
description of the “central component” of the Second Amendment does not
depend upon what James Madison or Thomas Jefferson thought about selfdefense, but rather requires an understanding of the common law canvas upon
which the Second Amendment was written as glossed by our best account of
political philosophy.
Self-defense as divine law will not be addressed in this article. It is an article
of faith among many that self-defense comes from God and is beyond any human
agency. But such a claim is not receptive to conventional tools of legal reasoning
and therefore must be left to other forms of disputation by other types of scholars.
The history of self-defense at common law shows that the core self-defense
right identified in Heller is not as indisputably individualistic, inalienable, and
innate as is often assumed. Instead, the state’s role in this concept has been
dominant throughout history. Understanding the history of this core of the
Second Amendment right has potential implications for public policy and law
concerning firearms. It suggests that the state has a power, and perhaps an
obligation, to ensure that private capacity to render lethal force conforms to
minimum standards of safety, training, and discipline.
II
THE COMMON LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF OTHERS
The common law of self-defense doesn’t begin with the individual, it begins
with the sovereign.14 In the first century after the Norman invasion of England,
the patchwork of local regulations, private vengeances, and family feuds were

12. Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1126 (2008).
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. Jim Chen, There’s No
Such Thing as Biopiracy . . . and It’s a Good Thing Too, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 24 (2006) (“[T]he
patent and copyright clause of the Constitution did not endorse the property-rights philosophy of John
Locke, Immanuel Kant, or Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.”) (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
14. See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 567 (1903)
(“[T]he right to kill in self-defense was slowly established, and is a doctrine of modern rather than
medieval law.”); see generally Bernard Brown, Self-Defence in Homicide From Strict Liability to
Complete Exculpation, 1958 CRIM. L. REV. 583 (1958) (tracing the history of self-defense from strict
liability to legal justification).
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gradually supplanted by an all-encompassing “king’s peace.”15 Initially, the king’s
peace existed only at “certain times, in certain places, and in favour of certain
privileged persons.”16 But eventually, the king’s peace came to “cover all times,
the whole realm, [and] all men.”17 Those “put outside the king’s peace and
protection” were deemed “outlaw[s],” and, theoretically, could be killed by any
private party.18
Roughly concurrent with the consolidation of the king’s peace, homicide split
into two types—justifiable and excusable.19 Justifiable homicide was faultless and
required an acquittal.20 Excusable homicide—including homicide se
defendendo—presumed fault but permitted appeal to the sovereign’s grace.21
Initially, a homicide was justified only in limited circumstances. Homicides
expressly ordered by the crown, as when executing a death sentence;22 and those
committed by necessity when arresting a manifest felon,23 a “hand-having thief,”24
or an outlaw 25 were justified. But this limited set of justifiable homicides “would
have been regarded less as cases of . . . self-defence than as executions.”26
Eventually, the common law extended the justification rationale to the
prevention of forcible felonies,27 and expanded the categories of felonies that
justified homicide to include arson, robbery, and burglary.28

15. See J.E.A. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 182 (4th ed.
1961); F. W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 10 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker
eds., 1979).
16. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 10. Examples would be at a coronation, on the public highways,
or in protection of the king’s own servants. Id.
17. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 14, at 583 (“The first business of a ruler is the elimination of all
forms of self-help . . . .”).
18. 3 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 605 (3d ed. 1923); see also 2 BRACTON
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 362 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans.,
1968) (“[An outlaw] may be slain by anyone with impunity, especially if he resists or takes to flight so
that his arrest is difficult”); Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200−1600, 74
MICH. L. REV. 413, 438 (1976).
19. See Green, supra note 18, at 419.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Rollin M. Perkins, Self-Defense Re-Examined, 1 UCLA L. REV. 133, 142 (1954).
23. See Beale, supra note 14, at 572, 574.
24. Green, supra note 18, at 439. A “hand-having thief” was one caught with the goods in his
possession. Id.
25. See id. at 419.
26. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 479 (2d ed. 1898); see also Brown, supra note 14, at 584–85 (noting that
justifiable homicides were limited to three very specific circumstances: executions, foresters who kill
trespassers on Royal lands who resist arrest, and “a hand-having thief or other manifest villain who tried
to resist arrest”).
27. See Green, supra note 18, at 442; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *180; 1
EDWARD HYDE EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 271–72 (1803). Pollock & Maitland are not certain that
such a homicide to prevent a felony would have been justifiable at common law in the thirteenth century.
See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 479 n.2.
28. Green, supra note 18, at 436.
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In practice, the facts that distinguished private vengeance, excusable selfdefense, and justifiable killing remained, as they are today, notoriously fuzzy and
contingent.29 Legal historian Thomas Greene suggests that medieval judges and
juries may have manipulated this lack of clarity to the ends of crime control.30
Expanding the range of justifiable homicides may have been in response to an
“unprecedented . . . rise in professional crime.”31
Though the factual circumstances of a given homicide may have resisted clear
categorization, the legal distinction was well established and consequential:32
Homicide was justified only when one acted as an actual or implicit agent of the
sovereign.33 Justified homicide led to acquittal; homicide solely in self-defense
required the king’s special mercy.
A person who killed another, even to preserve his own life, had to seek
pardon from the sovereign.34 Whatever the moral quality of self-defense, the
common law tilted in favor of the preservation of human life and the maintenance
of public order. As Coke reported, “although a man kills another in his defence
[sic]. . . without any intent, yet it is felony . . . for the great regard which the law
has to a man’s life . . . .”35 The necessity of self-preservation alone did not justify
homicide in the eyes of the law, and the formal requirement of forfeiture for selfdefense wasn’t abrogated until 1828.36
Those who killed in self-defense had to submit a request for pardon to the
king or to his ministers.37 The Statute of Gloucester (1278),38 for example,
provided that those accused of homicide who claimed self-defense had to remain

29. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 478 (noting the “very similar case” of an
execution and the “slaying of an outlaw or a hand-having thief or other manifest felon who resists
capture.”); Beale, supra note 14, at 568 (“The line between homicide in execution of the law and homicide
by misadventure or se defendendo was not yet clearly defined . . . .”).
30. Green, supra note 18, at 442.
31. Id.
32. See Perkins, supra note 22, at 141.
33. See Beale, supra note 14, at 572 (explaining that justifiable killing was limited to “warrant or . . .
custom”); Benjamin Levin, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (“The only justifiable homicide, therefore, was one committed under the auspices
of the state, or at least in clear furtherance of the state’s interests.”); Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination
of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 539 (1934) (“[O]nly those homicides were innocent which were
caused in the enforcement of justice . . . .”).
34. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 479 (“The man who commits homicide by
misadventure or in self-defence deserves but needs a pardon.”); see also 2 BRACTON, supra note 18, at
372–73 (noting the role of the king in granting pardon where a person acted self-defense).
35. Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (KB). The common law exception was the “castle
doctrine” which permitted lethal force to defend one’s dwelling. See id.
36. See The Offences Against the Person Act of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10 (stating that “no
[p]unishment or [f]orfeiture shall be incurred by any [p]erson who shall kill another by [m]isfortune, or
in his own [d]efence, or in any other [m]anner without [f]elony.”); see also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 26, at 481 (citing 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10). Pollock and Maitland note, however, that even before
1828 “[j]ustices allowed jurors to find a man ‘not guilty,’ instead of giving a special verdict about
misadventure or self-defence.” Id. at 481 n.3.
37. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 479–80.
38. 6 Edw. 1, c. 9 (Eng.).
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in jail, plead the defense to the king’s justices, and upon report of the justices to
the sovereign, “the King shall take [the accused] to his Grace, if it please him.”39
The pardon was not costless. The individual may have had to surrender his goods
to the king as a condition of the pardon.40 Even then, the individual still was
vulnerable to a private action by the family of the slain.41
Eventually pardons for homicide in self-defense became a formality,
operating by “course of law” rather than through supplication.42 Henry VIII, for
example, passed a statute that clarified that one who kills a robber on the highway
or burglar breaking into a home at night should not have to surrender his
property, but may be acquitted.43 But this statute merely clarified when the killing
of a robber or a thief was done on behalf of the law, and therefore justifiable. It
did not eradicate the distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide,44
which remained in the treatises on criminal law well into the nineteenth century.45
The legal distinction between homicide on behalf of the sovereign and
homicide as a private act of self-preservation persisted even as theories of natural
law came to influence English treatise writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.46 For example, in the seventeenth century, Coke wrote that killing a
potential robber who threatens bodily injury is justified, but killing an assailant
who threatens only bodily harm is merely excusable, for “[s]uch a precious regard
the law hath of the life of man” that even if it was necessary, and even though a
pardon may save his life, “yet he [s]hall forfeit all his goods and chattels.”47
Matthew Hale set out the general rule that the king is to monopolize violence
and that “private per[s]ons are not tru[s]ted to take capital revenge [on each
other].”48 By contrast, private persons may kill thieves and the man who kills
them has performed a public service, perhaps even a public duty.49 Edward Hyde
East’s Pleas of the Crown makes the distinction apparent: for a homicide to be

39. Id. See also 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 312; Brown, supra note 14, at 586.
40. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195 (“[A]nd in such case [of self-defense] he shall forfeit his
goods and chattels . . . .”); Green, supra note 18, at 425 (noting that by the middle of the 1300s, forfeiture
had “in effect become a penalty [for] . . . homicide in self-defense”).
41. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 482 (“The king could not protect the man-slayer
from the suit of the dead man’s kin.”); Green supra note 18, at 419.
42. See Beale, supra note 14, at 570; see also Brown, supra note 14, at 587; Green, supra note 18, at
419.
43. Killing a Thief Act 1532, 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (Eng.).
44. See Beale, supra note 14, at 571.
45. See Claire O. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 621, 637 (1996).
46. See Bernard J. Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a
Defence to Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 310 (1963) (noting that homicides in selfdefense and by misadventure “were, until the eighteenth century, treated for purposes of punishment on
an equal footing.”).
47. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (London: E & R Brooke ed.
1797); see also Beale, supra note 14, at 572. But see Perkins, supra note 22, at 139−45 (casting doubt on
Beale’s account of the rules for justifiable homicide).
48. 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 481 (1736); see also
Beale, supra note 14, at 574 (citing Hale for this distinction).
49. See id. at 484, 486, 487, 489.
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justified, there must be a felony.50 One who came to beat someone else or to take
his goods could be killed in self-defense, but it was only an excusable homicide.51
However one who “take[s] his goods as a felon” could be killed, and it was
justified.52
Michael Foster’s eighteenth century treatise repeatedly alludes to the law of
nature as a source of self-defense. But even Foster’s treatise shows the close
relationship between self-defense, public crime control, and justification at
common law. According to Foster, “homicide in advancement of ju[s]tice” is also
“founded in nece[ss]ity” because no government can allow a wrongdoer to flout
the orderly imposition of justice.53 It is the duty of individuals “where a felony is
committed, and the felon fleeth from ju[s]tice,” to prevent the felon’s escape.54 If
the fleeing felon is killed, “this will be deemed ju[s]tifiable homicide.”55
Although self-defense may be understood as rooted in natural law, according
to Foster, positive law coordinates this natural law with duty. Foster offers the
examples of using lethal force to repel a murderer, robber, burglar, or arsonist
and concludes that in these circumstances “nature and [s]ocial duty cooperate.”56
The citizen’s duty to enforce the law against felons and the citizen’s instinct for
self-preservation are then in accord. When they are not, as when a man kills
another while defending himself in the heat of an unplanned fight, then the
homicide is only excusable, not justifiable.57
The persistence of the distinction between justified self-defense and
excusable self-defense at common law only makes conceptual sense if one
understands that the homicide is justified when the slayer acts in some sense on
behalf of the state. It is merely excused when the slayer acts solely on his own
behalf.58 Or, as Beale summarizes, what distinguished justifiable from excusable
homicides is the line “between execution of the law and cases of private
defense.”59
Killing in defense of others was, at common law, derivative of self-defense.
At first, defense of others required some close relationship between the persons,
as in the case of spouses or masters and servants. Foster remarks that a servant
may interpose himself to prevent a felony from being committed against a master,
and if he happens to kill the would-be felon, the homicide is justifiable.60 The

50. EAST, supra note 27, at 271–72.
51. Id. at 272.
52. Id. (emphasis added); see also Beale, supra note 14, at 574.
53. SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN CASES 270 (3d ed. 1792).
54. Id. at 271; see also PAUL R. HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
97 (2003) (“Local people were bound by a very ancient obligation to pursue and arrest a hand-having
thief.”).
55. FOSTER, supra note 53, at 271.
56. Id. at 274.
57. Id. at 275–76.
58. See Beale, supra note 14, at 575; Finkelstein, supra note 45, at 637.
59. Beale, supra note 14, at 575.
60. See FOSTER, supra note 53, at 274.
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concept was one of “mutual and reciprocal defence,”61 or even (when undertaken
by the master or parent) defense of property. 62
In time, the law expanded the sphere of persons one could defend beyond
close relations and servants to the public at large.63 Although Blackstone spoke
of special relationships as creating a mutual defense, the English treatise writers
wrote that private citizens could, and perhaps were obliged to, prevent capital
felonies attempted in their presence or apprehend those who committed such
felonies. 64 As one nineteenth century American treatise writer noted: “It is not
only every person’s right, but it is his legal duty, to prevent a felony, even if he
has to go to the extreme of taking the life of the person attempting to commit
it.”65 A private party could also kill a felon, if such killing was necessary to prevent
the felon from escaping.66 To do so was thought to simply accelerate the ultimate
penalty of death for the felon, who forfeited his life by committing the crime.67 In
this way, theories of self-defense and defense of others merged with a duty to
enforce the law against actual or attempted felons.
Early American cases on the criminal law reproduced these common law
distinctions between justifiable and excusable homicide. In one of the earliest
recorded criminal cases in the United States, a judge instructed a New Jersey jury
“that homicide was, in some cases, justifiable, and in others was excusable . . . .”68
In “the most important murder trial of the early republic,”69 the 1806
Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Selfridge,70 the grand jury charge again
made an express distinction between a justified homicide to prevent a felonious
attack and excusable homicide to prevent a non-felonious attack.71 Selfridge, as
Richard Singer notes, “is the first case—and certainly the first American case—
to use the term ‘self defense’ to describe what up until that point in legal history
was characterized as a justifiable prevention of felony.”72 American law near the
Founding recognized a conceptual distinction between justifiable homicide and

61. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *3. But apparently contrary to Foster,
Blackstone describes it as an “excuse” to homicide, not a justification. See id. at *4
62. Id. See also Marco F. Bendinelli & James T. Edsall, Defense of Others: Origins, Requirements,
Limitations and Ramifications, 5 REGENT U.L. REV. 153, 155 (1995) (discussing origin of defense of
others as related to property rights).
63. Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 62, at 155, 200–02.
64. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at *3, 178, 179; 1 HALE, supra note 48 at 484, 486, 487, 489.
65. WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 137 (1894).
66. See John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private Use of Deadly Force, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1243–44 (2014) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985)).
67. Id.
68. State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424, 427 (1790).
69. Saul Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation and the Second Amendment: A Closer Look at the
Evidence, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 199 (2007).
70. 2 Am. St. Trials 544 (1806).
71. See Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your Ground” and Self-Defense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 100 n.39
(2015) (quoting grand jury charge from Selfridge).
72. Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self
Defense, 28 B.C.L. REV. 459, 477 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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excusable homicide, just as it had been recognized in English common law.73 It
was only in the generations afterward, as American law grew independent from
its English progenitors that a unique American self-defense law emerged and the
distinction between justifiable homicide in the service of law enforcement and
homicide as pure self-preservation began to collapse.74
To summarize, although natural law theories of self-defense found their way
into criminal law treatises in the eighteenth century, these theories were not fully
integrated into the common law system of Anglo-American jurisprudence at the
Founding. The common law up to the nineteenth century retained a distinction
between killing at the behest of the crown or as an adjunct to law enforcement
and killing purely as a matter of self-defense or necessity.75 Justifiable homicide
was the work of the sovereign, directly or indirectly, for “the law mu[s]t require
[the homicide] otherwise it is not justifiable”;76 excusable homicide, by contrast,
was the work of the great universal “principle of [s]elf-pre[s]ervation.”77
Whatever the common consequence to the alleged offender, the two forms of
homicide were conceptually distinct. Justifiable homicide deserved no
punishment or condemnation; excusable homicide retained at least a shadow of
suspicion “to caution men how they venture to kill another upon their own
private judgment.”78 It is doubtful, then, that the kind of inalienable and
individual right to self-defense commonly articulated in gun debates today is as
deeply rooted in our Anglo-American common law tradition as has been
assumed.
Some commentators challenge self-defense as a purely individual, inviolate
right retained from the state of nature.79 These challenges offer support to this
descriptive account of Anglo-American common law. Professor Jud Campbell
has observed that the Framers “widely agreed” that “retained natural rights
could be regulated in the public interest by the people or their representatives.”80
The focus was on developing structures and norms of government that worked in
the public interest, not primarily on protecting areas of natural liberty from
government regulation.81 “Consequently,” Campbell writes, “most retained

73. However, “there is no indication that courts ever enforced forfeiture [for excusable homicide]
in the United States.” Id. at 473.
74. See id.
75. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *181–82; see also Finkelstein, supra note 45, at 637.
76. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *178.
77. Id. at *182.
78. Id. at *187.
79. See Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1170, 1190–91 (2010) (describing one
power rule as “to separate the person who exercises the power from the person with decisionmaking
authority about whether it should be exercised”); see generally Thorburn, supra note 12 (discussing
notions of authority as essential to notions of justification in criminal law).
80. Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 98
(2017).
81. Id. at 97–98 & n.62.
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natural rights were individual rights that could be collectively defined and
controlled.”82
One way of controlling such natural rights, as discussed before, is to
harmonize private self-interested violence with public interest. As Joshua Stein
has written, “broadened right[s] to self-defense,” in American criminal law,
“came, paradoxically, from a desire to empower or deputize Americans to
combat violence.”83 In a state in which the “king’s peace” had been replaced by
a more republican “citizens’ peace,” the way to counter widespread private
violence was for the state to confer public authority upon every citizen to fight
it.84
Professor Malcolm Thorburn has noted that a fundamental component of
justification in Anglo-American criminal law is an exercise of authority.85
Justifications in the criminal law define what is permissible from what is
forgivable. When a police officer physically restrains someone during an arrest,
the criminal law does not treat the event as a moral wrong that the officer must
excuse by reference to some utilitarian or deontological rationale.86 Police are
justified in holding someone against their will when they effect an arrest because
of their authority as police officers.87
By contrast, a private individual who holds another against her will ordinarily
must explain why his behavior does not constitute a crime. The difference is the
deference with which the law treats the judgments of the officer as opposed to
the private citizen. The criminal law is not structured to provide a free-floating
authorization for everyone to do whatever is best. The most important question,
according to Thorburn, is not whether the act was justified in some utilitarian or
deontological sense, but who gets to decide whether the act is justified and
when.88 It is the discretion to justify—who gets to exercise that discretion, the
scope of that discretion, and the norms to guide that discretion—that is the most
important normative issue with respect to justification.89
In cases of self-defense, the law instructs one decisionmaker (the court) to
review the judgment (to harm or kill a person) of another decisionmaker (the
person claiming self-defense) as to whether that judgment was justified in that
case.90 In most cases of self-defense, the decision on justification and the decision
to act are made by the individual in the moment because deference to another
authority is not possible. This is the classic account of when self-defense is
82. Id. at 98.
83. Joshua Stein, Privatizing Violence: A Transformation in the Jurisprudence of Assault, 30 LAW &
HIST. REV. 424, 425 (2012).
84. Id. at 437.
85. See generally Thorburn, supra note 12 (discussing how authority and justification interact in the
institutional structure of criminal law).
86. Id. at 1072.
87. Id. at 1092.
88. Id. at 1074–75.
89. See id. at 1075 (identifying these three critical normative issues).
90. See id. at 1097 (setting out this three step process).

MILLER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2017]

4/8/2017 2:00 PM

SELF-DEFENSE AND THE STATE

95

available in criminal law; it is only available when appeal to some superior
authority in the legal order is unavailable.91 In this account, if both a private
citizen and a police officer were simultaneously confronted with a person with a
suspected weapon, the private citizen must defer to the police officer’s decision
as to whether deadly force was necessary and proportional to the threat.92
According to this reading of justification, where the private individual is
authorized by the law to exercise self-defense, it is not because he or she is acting
according to an inalienable right in the state of nature. Instead, the very structure
of justification in Anglo-American criminal law means these individuals exercise
an authority derivative of the state. The same kind of justificatory reasoning that
applies to police officers who violate otherwise applicable criminal law applies to
private individuals as well.93 One who kills another in self-defense is not justified
because of inalienable right, but because she acts as a “public official[] pro
tempore.”94
III
IMPLICATIONS
Popular accounts of self-defense as an inalienable reservation of individual
right is hard to square with the actual law of self-defense in the common law
tradition. At the time of the Constitution’s ratification, the common law had not
completely integrated the natural rights arguments of Locke and his
contemporaries, much less the liberal philosophy of John Stuart Mill or the
neoliberalism of twentieth century philosophers like Robert Nozick.95 The
faultlessness of a homicide turned on notions of crime prevention, public order,
and punishment, rather than notions of human autonomy. Additionally, the
liberal conception of self-defense may not be the best account of the practice in
Anglo-American law, as demonstrated by Professor Thorburn, whatever moral
philosophers may think of the subject.96 But, even if it is conceded that selfdefense is heavily constructed by the state as a matter of legal history and in some
accounts of political philosophy and criminal law theory, what relevance is it to
Second Amendment law and doctrine?

91. Id. at 1108 (“Private citizens do not have a standing power to make these decisions [about selfdefense or arrests]; rather, they are entitled to decide when it is appropriate to use force in self-defense,
to prevent a greater evil, or to effect an arrest only where recourse to state officials is impracticable.”);
see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 550, 594–95 (2008) (“Americans understood the ‘right of
self-preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his
behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’”(citation omitted)).
92. See Thorburn, supra note 12, at 1109 (making a similar argument).
93. See id. at 1128.
94. Id. at 1129. But see John Gardner, Justification Under Authority (Oxford Legal Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 5, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345763 [https://perma.
cc/599L-9H6W] (casting doubt on this description of self-defense).
95. See supra Part II.
96. See supra Part II.

MILLER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

96

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/8/2017 2:00 PM

[Vol. 80: 85

It is relevant for at least three reasons. First, recognizing how pervasive the
state has been in the history and philosophy of self-defense reveals the
assumptions about self-defense nestled in the heart of the Court’s Second
Amendment jurisprudence. Heller and various other cases and commentators
assume that self-defense in the English tradition is rooted in a particularly
individualistic strand of liberal philosophy and natural law.97 As a consequence,
they assume the Second Amendment merely entrenches this conception of liberal
and natural law philosophy in constitutional law.98 Recognizing the state’s role in
constructing self-defense at common law suggests a different place for the
baseline than the Court assumes in Heller. Second, it implicates the state as an
actor when governments liberalize self-defense law through loosened gun
regulations, stand your ground laws, or other similar mechanisms. The state is
acting. It is choosing a baseline different than the one supplied by the common
law. Perhaps the state is not acting in the sense of meeting all the doctrinal
requirements of “state action.” But, as Laurence Tribe once said about property
rights, understanding the common law history of self-defense exposes the
government’s role in bending the “geometry of the . . . common law”99—a
geometry in which ostensibly private parties perform uniquely public functions.
Finally, accepting the role of the state in self-defense law provides some potential
avenues for discussion, and perhaps agreement, in an otherwise incredibly
polarized public dialogue on gun rights and gun regulations.
A. Baseline Assumptions About Self-Defense
The Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence does not delve into the details
of the common law of self-defense other than to establish that its roots are
ancient.100 It assumes the common law of self-defense reflects a strong individual
rights bias. But, as this article has attempted to show, the common law baseline
of self-defense is not precisely where the Court assumes it to be. Instead of fixing
Second Amendment self-defense law as it existed in 1791, the Court assumes a
common law baseline more in keeping with liberal philosophy.
Baselines are critical in all kinds of legal disputes, including constitutional
ones. Baselines provide reference points to determine when law has changed,
when governments have acted or failed to act, and when rights have been
violated.101 Debates over Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms have

97. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 585, 593, 611; Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 15-2234 (RJL), 2016 WL
2908407, at *6 (May 7, 2016 D.D.C.) (“[T]he first step in [Second Amendment adjudication] is examining
the right we inherited from English and natural law.”); O’Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1523–26.
98. See e.g., Grace, No. 15-2234 (RJL), 2016 WL 2908407, at *6; O’Scannlain, supra note 9, at 1523–
26.
99. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1989).
100. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
101. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 883–902 (1987) (describing
how Lochner can be used as a baseline for various constitutional law issues).
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been argued with assumed and unarticulated baselines of self-defense. That the
state was far more involved in shaping the norms of self-defense at common law
than is conventionally understood exposes the contestability of the accuracy, and
certainly the “naturalness,” of the Heller’s baseline.
Baselines may be challenged, of course. One may say that the AngloAmerican common law baseline is immoral on some deontological or utilitarian
basis. One may consider a sovereign-centered notion of self-defense, the “king’s
peace,” or even the whole Weberian notion of a monopoly on the legitimate use
of violence antiquated or corrupted, as fit for the dustbin of history as sovereign
immunity, coverture, or holding human beings as property.
Even with no moral reservations, one may challenge the common law history
of self-defense descriptively. One may say it no longer accurately captures our
legal practice. Whatever the truth of the sovereign-centered notion of selfdefense in the past, our present understanding of self-defense is the product of
liberal philosophy and individual rights. Consequently, the history of self-defense
that lay at the core of the Second Amendment is less important now than these
liberal conceptions of the right.102 Whether the objection is moral or descriptive,
it is perfectly rational to say the Framers’ self-defense law is not our self-defense
law, and to insist that our notions of the Second Amendment must reflect those
changes in morality or law that have developed after 1791.
One may reject the legal significance of this common law history to modern
debates about self-defense, guns, and gun policy. But its historical existence
cannot be denied, and the necessity of deciding whether to adopt, modify, or
reject this history cannot be avoided. Identifying as accurately as possible the
common law history of self-defense only serves to focus the discussion. It does
not thereby transform the common law into a found thing, unconstructed, prepolitical, neutral, and natural.103 If this article has attempted to prove anything, it
is that our law of self-defense is not natural or neutral; it is a choice.
B. Baseline Choices And The State
If the baseline of Second Amendment self-defense rests roughly where it was
at English common law, then homicides are generally illegal. They are justified
only when the slayer acts on behalf of the law or in advancement of certain public
ends such as crime control, criminal justice, and punishment.104 Once the baseline
set by the common law tradition is recaptured, then it must be asked whether and

102. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The change could be a result of gradual case-by-case adjudication in
criminal law, or by codification. Or one could argue that there were convulsive shocks—like the Civil
War and Reconstruction—that rendered this history of self-defense a useless relic. See Bruce Ackerman,
The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1797–98 (2007).
103. See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The
Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 916 (1989) (“Baselines embody important moral and
political choices, but because they are starting points for analysis, they tend to suppress discussion of
these choices.”).
104. See supra Part III.
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under what conditions the responsibility for such a homicide can be delegated to
private persons.
The division between state action and non-state action is a baseline choice
that reflects a “normative theory of the legitimate or normal activities of
government.”105 Deviations from the common law baseline, wherever it may be
set, determine when the government has acted.106
In a functioning state, the government’s obligations with respect to deadly
force against others—at least in public107—could be “non-delegable.” Nondelegable government functions are “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State”108 and having been “traditionally associated with sovereignty.”109 The
power to kill another human being was, according to English common law
history, a power traditionally exclusive to the sovereign. When done on behalf on
the sovereign, the killing was justified, because the individual acted as an actual
or implicit agent of the king. When the killing was done purely for personal
purposes, the act required active—and later implicit—forgiveness by the
sovereign.
The doctrine of non-delegation means “[t]he government may delegate the
task but not the responsibility, and the private actor performing that
governmental function must act within the constitutional limitations that apply
to the government.”110 In the same way that a state could not rid itself of its Due
Process or Eighth Amendment obligations by auctioning off the authority to
perform an execution,111 so the state cannot rid itself of the responsibility to
ensure that deadly force in service of the law is exercised according to
constitutional constraints.112 Laws that empower private citizens to visit lethal
force upon others in furtherance of crime control without a corresponding
responsibility of the state shows the state’s attempt to shift the baseline.
In its most dramatic form, a government’s attempt to delegate both the act
and the responsibility for a homicide against felons could be a form of
“outlawry.” Outlawry at common law was the power of the king to declare a
person outside the sovereign’s protection—outside of the law. Such a person
could be captured and, if he ran, perhaps killed by any private party. As a North
Carolina federal court described North Carolina’s law: “The effect of the
105. Sunstein, supra note 101, at 888.
106. See id.
107. The castle doctrine is so rooted in Anglo-American common law that it would be difficult to call
its adoption a shift, rather than the setting, of a baseline.
108. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
109. Id. at 353; see also Watts, supra note 66, at 1264–65 (exploring Jackson and non-delegation).
110. Watts, supra note 66, at 1265.
111. Outlawry has generally been considered a grievous due process violation. See e.g., Green v.
United States, 356 U.S. 165, 171 (1958) (“[T]he severe remedy of outlawry, which fell into early disuse in
the state courts, was never known to the federal law.”); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 444 (1897) (“[I]f
such power obtained, then the ancient common-law doctrine of ‘outlawry,’ and that of the continental
systems as to ‘civil death,’ would be a part of the chancery law,—a theory which could not be admitted
without violating the rudimentary conceptions of the fundamental rights of the citizen.”).
112. See Watts, supra note 66, at 1265.
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proclamation [of outlawry] is to license the public to kill the accused felon if he
runs after being called on to surrender.”113 Outlawry cannot be defended on the
basis that private parties execute the lethal act. It is the state’s removal of the
person from a baseline of legal protection that raises due process concerns.114
But one does not have to believe such a delegation amounts to outlawry to
see the effects of a shift in the baseline. It is a truism that section 1983—which
mirrors the state action doctrine—only punishes government actions, not
inactions.115 Generally, a municipality cannot be held liable for the failures of its
agents.116
However, for some discrete failures, a municipality can be held liable. One
such scenario is the “failure to train” theory of municipal liability. The
quintessential “failure to train” case, described in City of Canton v. Harris, is to
equip police officers with firearms, but fail to adequately train them in “the
constitutional limitations . . . on the use of deadly force.”117 Such a failure amounts
to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of others because of the “moral
certainty” that a police officer with a firearm may have to decide the
constitutional requirements of using that weapon.118 Harris’s example makes
sense only if one understands there is a baseline that requires the state to ensure
that its agents are given constitutionally adequate training to use lethal force on
individuals. Deviations from this baseline are not just “inaction” but a deliberate
choice to permit unconstitutionally excessive force.
Something like the quintessential “failure to train” case is happening
nationwide with respect to what gun-rights advocates call “constitutional
carry”—the right to carry firearms for self-defense and defense of others, with no
training whatsoever.119 Currently at least nine states—Alaska, Arizona, Idaho,
Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming—do not
require a permit to carry certain firearms in public.120 In none of these states is a
113. Autry v. Mitchell, 420 F. Supp. 967, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
114. See id. at 971 (“The extreme remedy granted the citizenry infringes, we think, a fundamental
right: that one not be denied life, or be wounded, except by due process of law.”).
115. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012).
116. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“Respondeat superior or vicarious liability
will not attach under § 1983.”).
117. Id. at 396 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 390 n.10 (majority opinion).
119. See, e.g., Maine Lawmaker Submits ‘Constitutional Carry’ bill, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 26,
2015, 7:26 P.M.), http://bangordailynews.com/2015/02/26/news/state/maine-lawmaker-submits-con
stitutional-carry-bill/ [https://perma.cc/YQH3-XUVU]; Matt Vespa, Missouri Looks to Join
Constitutional Carry Club, TOWNHALL.COM (Apr. 29, 2016, 2:02 P.M.), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/
mattvespa/2016/04/29/missouri-looks-to-join-constitutional-carry-club-n2155373 [https://perma.cc/VX
K9-98CP]. Other names for “constitutional carry” are “permit-less carry” or “Vermont carry.”
120. While some states do issue permits or provide optional training, no permit or training is legally
required to carry a firearm in these states. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220 (2015) (weapons misconduct
under Alaska law involves only a failure to notify an officer of the presence of a concealed weapon);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2014) (weapons misconduct is limited to carrying firearms under
certain prohibited conditions, such as in furtherance of a criminal offense); IDAHO CODE § 18-3302(3)–
(4) (2016) (any person, resident, or non-resident in Idaho over the age of eighteen may carry a concealed
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person required to receive any training on when and under what circumstances
he can use lethal force.
Thirty-nine other states require a permit to carry a concealed weapon, but
only twenty-seven of them require training in firearm use or safety to obtain the
permit.121 Further, even for those states that require firearm use and safety
training, the amount and depth of training varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
and may or may not include such features as live firing training or instruction on
use of deadly force. Even in those jurisdictions that require some training for
concealed carry, they may not require similar training for open carry.122
In many cases, the articulated reason for loose gun regulation is the belief that
widespread arms bearing will aid law enforcement and bring down the level of
crime in the population at large.123 And yet, these jurisdictions have empowered
individuals to mete out lethal force directly or indirectly in service of crime
handgun outside the boundaries of a city, but only Idaho residents over twenty-one can carry a firearm
inside the confines of a city without a permit); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c03(a) (2015) (“The availability
of licenses to carry concealed handguns under this act shall not be construed to impose a general
prohibition on the carrying of handguns without such license, whether carried openly or concealed, or
loaded or unloaded.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2001-A(2)(A-1) (2015) (“The provisions of this
section concerning the carrying of concealed weapons do not apply to: [a] handgun carried by a person
who is 21 years of age or older and is not otherwise prohibited from carrying a firearm . . . .”); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(24) (2016) (“A license . . . is not required [when the weapons is] carried upon the
person in a sheath, belt holster or shoulder holster or in a purse, handbag, satchel, other similar bag or
briefcase or fully enclosed case . . . .”); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-7(c) (2016) (“Any person may carry a
concealed deadly weapon without a license therefor[e] who is: (1) At least twenty-one years of age; (2)
A United States citizen or legal resident thereof; (3) Not prohibited from possessing a firearm under this
section . . . .”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(b)(i) (2016) (noting that among other regulations, an
individual must be “a resident of the United States and ha[ve] been a resident of Wyoming for not less
than six (6) months” in order to carry without a permit); State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (1903) (upholding
a right to permit-less carry in Vermont, per the Vermont Constitution of 1777).
121. See Concealed Weapons Permitting, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgun
laws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/firearms-in-public-places/concealed-weapons-permitting/ [https://perma.
cc/E2YX-RXFA].
122. Louisiana, for example, allows open carry without a license, but concealed carry license
applicants must complete a Department of Public Safety–approved firearms training course with at least
nine hours of instruction, including three hours concerning “the use of deadly force and conflict
resolution.” See LA. STAT. ANN. § 1379.3(D) (2016). Similarly, Colorado allows open carry without a
license, but requires concealed carry applicants to complete a firearms safety training course approved
by the authorities, or demonstrate firearm competence according to alternative identified methods. See
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-12-202, 203 (2016).
123. See, e.g., Eric Nicholson, Factcheck: Dan Patrick Says Open Carry Laws Decrease Crime by 25
Percent, DALLAS OBSERVER (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:01 A.M.), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/factcheckdan-patrick-says-open-carry-laws-decrease-crime-by-25-percent-7906682
[https://perma.cc/Y6QUYZQS] (discussing Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick’s assertion about a twenty five percent
decrease in crime in states that permit open or concealed carry); Larry Pratt, Open Carry Deters Crime,
U.S. NEWS (Apr. 25, 2012, 4:08 P.M.), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-people-be-allowed-tocarry-guns-openly/open-carry-deters-crime [https://perma.cc/XSX3-962N] (stating that open carry is
becoming more widespread because of its demonstrable effect in decreasing crime); Dwight R. Worley,
Self Defense Argument at Center of Gun Debate, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2013, 10:00 A.M.),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/25/self-defense-gun-debate/1945591/ [https://perma
.cc/438X-CDNM] (reviewing debate on the frequency with which guns are used for self-defense); Fact
Sheet: Guns Save Lives, GUN OWNERS OF AM., https://www.gunowners.org/sk0802htm.htm
[https://perma.cc/H85A-SBE4].
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control, without meeting the constitutional minimum of training required of
police officers or other express agents of the state. The public policy of many
jurisdictions is, in effect, to empower a group of adults to police everyone, with
only the threat of post-hoc criminal liability to regulate their behavior.
Whether a municipality is liable for permitting inadequately trained gun
owners to carry firearms for defense of themselves and others is beyond the scope
of this article.124 Nor does this article prove that all persons who defend
themselves with lethal force necessarily become agents of the state, subjecting
themselves and the municipality to section 1983 liability. This short article cannot
hope to clean up the “conceptual disaster area” of state action.125 Instead, the
goal is to raise the possibility that, when it comes to empowering private
individuals to render lethal force in the service of crime control, there may be a
greater role and responsibility for government than the liberal natural law
discussion of self-defense and gun rights would suggest. The issue of untrained or
inadequately trained citizenry authorized by law to kill others takes on a different
cast if one understands this as a policy decision, a departure from a baseline of
the common law, rather than the expression of some inalienable reservation of
rights that existed before the Founding.
C. Legislating Both Gun Rights And Gun Responsibilities
Finally, recognizing these baselines could help bridge the poles of our gun
politics. Some gun rights advocates have sought to federalize protections of gun
rights, primarily through federal legislation that would lead to nationwide
reciprocity for concealed carry permits.126 Early versions of this reciprocity
movement relied upon Congress’s power to enforce civil rights through its
Fourteenth Amendment section five power.127 One can imagine similar bills
promoted by pro-gun groups to advocate prohibiting state universities from
keeping firearms off campus, just as the section five power is used to prohibit
other types of discrimination on campus.128
If such pro-gun legislative proposals were to be debated in Congress, they
could provide an entrée for other civil rights protections. The federal government
124. Certainly, such a theory would have to contend with the proposition that there is no general
constitutional duty for any unit of government to protect a private individual from the harm of another
private individual. See DeShaney v. Winnebego Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
125. Charles L. Black, Jr., “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
126. See Constitutional Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2015, S. 498, 114th Cong. (2015);
National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2015, H.R. 402, 114th Cong. (2015).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011, H.R. 822,
112th Cong. § 2 (a)(2) (2011).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (“A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of . . . title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 . . . .”); Johnson v. Univ. Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are permissible against the University in federal court notwithstanding the
Eleventh Amendment . . . .”); Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas ex rel. May, 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir.
2001).
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already plays a significant role in ensuring local law enforcement complies with
constitutional standards; in extraordinary cases, they have the authority to
oversee the reformation of police practices to remedy past constitutional
violations and prevent future ones.129 To the extent that states, through their open
carry and concealed carry policies, essentially permit significant policing
functions to be conducted by private actors, a similar set of considerations may
come into play.
Understanding the unique public nature of self-defense historically may help
buttress the arguments for such federalization of what appears to be a private
phenomenon. Consequently, mandatory minimums for training, including, for
example, training on the use of lethal force, de-biasing training to ensure that
racial minorities are not unfairly targeted by armed citizens, and perhaps
mandatory requirements for insurance, would ensure that all persons (public and
private) authorized to use firearms to enforce the law better address—ex ante—
the costs of the wrongful use of lethal power.
IV
CONCLUSION
Heller said that self-defense was the “central component” of the Second
Amendment. But the philosophical and legal assumptions that accompany that
assertion demand investigation. This article has attempted to supply a more
nuanced account of the historical and philosophical self-defense baseline than is
provided by gun policy debates and legal opinions. It suggests that as a matter of
common law history and political philosophy, the state has a far more active role
in shaping this core right than is typically acknowledged. Of course, describing
the location of the baseline says little about whether it should remain there. But
the faint hope of this article is that, if we can at least agree on where we stand, we
can devote more time discussing where we should go.

129. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).

